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MOTOR-VOTER AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN MISSISSIPPI
Robert E. Sanders*
In Young v. Fordice1 , the United States Supreme Court may have set the foun-

dation for ending Mississippi's control of voter registration within the state's borders. Mississippi's constitutional authority and duty to establish the regulatory

framework for registration of voters within the State may soon be illusory.
The case presented a challenge under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act2 to the

State of Mississippi's implementation of the mandates of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA).'

By its express terms, the NVRA mandates

only that states provide citizens certain opportunities to register to vote infederal
elections.' Nothing in the NVRA has anything to do with voter registration for
state elections. To implement the NVRA, Mississippi simply did what the
NVRA requires. The state made voter registration for federal elections available
at locations where citizens apply for drivers' licenses and at various other agen5
cies where citizens apply for government benefits.
The state voter registration statutes establishing eligibility for inclusion on

state voter rolls were not changed either by the Mississippi Legislature or by

operation of the NVRA. As before implementation of the NVRA, in order to be
universally registered to vote in Mississippi, one need only comply with the
extremely accommodating requirements of Mississippi law.6 As contemplated by

the NVRA, those registering pursuant to NVRA requirements are registered only
for federal elections. The plaintiffs and their amici7 incorrectly asserted that this
resulted in an unprecleared dual registration system in spite of the fact that no
one is required to register twice in order to be universally registered. Both
before the implementation of the NVRA and presently, an individual need register only one time, under the provisions of Mississippi law, to be a registered voter

for every election-local, state, or federal-conducted in that voter's
jurisdiction.8
* Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of Mississippi since 1978 in the Civil Litigation Division;
B.B.A., 1972, University of Mississippi; J.D., 1977, Jackson School of Law at Mississippi College.
1. 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997). The plaintiffs were individuals represented by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law. The defendants were Governor Kirk Fordice, Attorney General Mike Moore, Secretary of
State Dick Molpus, and Gregg Phillips, Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Human Services.
The defendants were sued in their official capacities only. The United States filed a separate action styled
United States v. State of Mississippi. The actions were consolidated for trial. Summary judgment was subsequently entered for the defendants in both actions. Only the Young plaintiffs prosecuted the appeal. The United
States participated as amicus for the plaintiffs. The office of the Solicitor General participated at oral argument.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
9
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1 73gg to 1973gg-10 (1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2 (1994).
5. The NVRA also has requirements relating to mail-in registration and purging. The requirements of the
NVRA apply to all states which on or after March 11, 1993, required registration, but did not permit electionday registration. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2 (1994). Various state agency heads issued administrative fiats instructing appropriate agency employees to make federal registration forms available to agency patrons.
6. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-1 to -151 (1990 and Supp. 1997).
7. The plaintiffs' amici were the United States, through the Office of the Solicitor General, the Community
Service Society of New York, and the American Association of Retired Persons. The Office of the Solicitor
General participated at oral argument. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1231 (1997).
8. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-1 to -151.
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THE CASE

The plaintiffs' theory of a voting rights violation arose from a confusing set of
circumstances surrounding the state's section 5 submission of its administrative
plan for NVRA implementation. The confusion was caused in equal parts by the
U.S. Department of Justice and by an employee of the Mississippi Secretary of
State's office.
The NVRA was adopted into law in 1993. During 1993, Mississippi began
planning for its January 1, 1995, implementation of the requirements of the
NVRA. On December 15, 1993, Governor Kirk Fordice issued an Executive
Order that created a committee to plan for implementation and named the
Mississippi Secretary of State as the official responsible for coordinating State
efforts." The committee had the responsibility of giving advice and making proposals to the State agencies through which the NVRA would be implemented."
The committee also had the responsibility of giving advice and making proposals
to the Mississippi Legislature, should the Legislature decide to change the
already liberal Mississippi voter registration laws to conform to the requirements
of the NVRA. 2 During 1994, the committee held various meetings and generated plans and materials designed to make implementation go smoothly.
As envisioned by the committee, proposed actions to implement the NVRA
consisted of two basic types: administrative and legislative. First, the committee
proposed that agency administrators could, by administrative fiat, set procedures
by which voter registration forms required by the NVRA could be distributed.
The head of a particular state agency, such as the Department of Human Services
or the Department of Public Safety, could simply decree that employees within
that agency would make NVRA voter registration forms available, under certain
conditions, to agency patrons. The state had to choose which agencies would
provide NVRA registration material, the process those agencies would follow,
and the information they would include on the NVRA registration forms. These
recommended administrative actions were adopted, and NVRA registration
forms were made available to agency patrons.
The plaintiffs took the position that these administrative actions were within
the reach of the Voting Rights Act and required section 5 preclearance.13 The
defendants' position was that the State did not have true discretion in making
these agency designations or in the other administrative choices associated with
NVRA implementation. The provisions of the NVRA mandated that the state's
drivers' license bureaus were to be designated as agencies which were to provide
NVRA registration services."' Similarly, the NVRA mandated that state agencies
that provided services to disabled citizens must distribute NVRA registration
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2.
Exec. Order No. 739 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1234 (1997).
73
Id. at 1236. See also, 42 U.S.C. § 19 gg-3 (1994).
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forms to agency patrons. 5 The state's only discretion was in determining which
of its agencies fit the description contained in the NVRA's mandate.16
The second type of actions proposed by the committee were legislative
changes in state registration law. Legislative changes were those necessary to
change anything previously set in place by state statute. Matters controlled by
statute included the qualifications for enrollment on state voter rolls, purging
requirements, and the form of the State registration application.17 By custom and
practice, and generally by statute, legislative changes affecting voting are submitted for preclearance by the Mississippi Attorney General."8 The Governor's
Executive Order designated that office as the proper submitting authority. 9
Clearly, had the Mississippi Legislature made any changes to state registration
law, those changes would have been subject to preclearance, but no such changes
were made.
From time to time, an Assistant Secretary of State made informational mailings of committee material to officials with the U.S. Department of Justice. Her
purpose in making these informational mailings was to keep federal officials
apprised of the activities of the committee and of the progress of Mississippi's
plan for implementing the NVRA. On December 20, 1994, an official with the
Department of Justice suggested in a telephone conversation with an attorney
from the Office of the Secretary of State that the matters previously outlined in
informational mailings should be submitted for section 5 preclearance." In
response, the Assistant Secretary of State wrote the Justice Department on the
same day, December 20, and requested simply that the Department consider all
the prior informational mailings as one large undifferentiated section 5 submission.21
The informational material sent by the Assistant Secretary of State outlined the
administrative actions to be taken by the state, such as the proposed designations
of state agencies where NVRA applications would be distributed, the process
those agencies would follow, and a new voter registration form that would
replace the state's old form.2 The proposed change in the state voter registration
form could only have been made if the legislation proposed by the committee
had been adopted in the form suggested in the committee's draft legislation.23
The mailings also included a copy of the proposed legislation itself. The
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5 (1994).
16. Id.
17. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-11 to -21; 23-15-39; 23-15-151 to -161 (1990).

18. Whenever statutory changes are made, the legislature generally includes in the statutory package a
requirement that the matter be submitted by the Office of the Attorney General for preclearance.
19. Exec. Order No. 739 (1993).
20. Brief for Appellee at 4, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
21. Id.
22. The submission was contained in various informational mailings sent to the Department of Justice over a
period of months. Portions of the submission are reproduced in the Joint Appendix at 14-104, Young v. Fordice,
117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
23. The submission also contained such extraneous material as an NVRA information manual, model office
procedures, updates, status reports, summary of legislative efforts, reports of committee hearings, summaries of
committee discussions, summaries of community outreach programs, and reports of training programs.
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Department of Justice understood that changes to requirements imposed by state
law, such as the qualifications for enrollment on state voter rolls and changes to
state voter registration forms, could not be accomplished without passage of the
proposed legislation that was to be introduced in the January session of the legislature.
In early January, 1995, the Mississippi Legislature convened, and the legislation proposed by the commission was introduced. It died in committee on
January 25, 1995.24 The Department of Justice, with full knowledge that the proposed legislative changes were dead,2" and with the apparent intention of doing
what it could to change Mississippi statutory law by its own administrative fiat,
promptly precleared the Assistant Secretary of State's submission on February 1,
1995. In its preclearance letter, the Department listed the matters it considered
to have been precleared. 8 Included in the list were the administrative choices of
agencies and processes to implement the NVRA.2 7 Also included in the
Department's listing of "changes" it purported to preclear were the proposed
changes to the Mississippi statutory mail-in registration form and changes to the
Mississippi statutory purge provision, which had been contained in the failed legislation. 28 In reality, neither the mail-in registration form nor the statutory purge
provision was changed at all. After the preclearance, the Department of Justice
announced that the proposed legislative changes had, by virtue of the preclearance, been accomplished without legislative approval.
As later found by the district court, the "changes" precleared by the
Department of Justice did not truly represent any accomplished changes in
Mississippi registration statutes controlling state registration or elections. 29 The
State's view was that the only matters which were actually precleared were those
matters implemented without legislation, such as the administrative actions
which occurred at state agency offices. 3 The plaintiffs contended, however, that
officials with the Secretary of State and the Department of Justice believed that
the Legislature would enact the proposed reconciling legislation." The plaintiffs
also contended that the informational mailings, therefore, implied that the forms
and procedures set forth in the submission would eventually apply to state registration as well as federal registration.3 2 Since the Department of Justice purported to preclear changes it believed were implied in the submission, or which it
expected would occur in state requirements, the plaintiffs and the United States
24. See Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1233 (1997).
25. The Department of Justice conceded during this proceeding that it was fully aware the proposed legislation had been rejected at the time it issued its preclearance letter. United States Brief for Appellant at 26, n. 14,
Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
26. Juris. Statement at 15a, Young, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1234 (1997).
30. Brief for Appellee at 7,Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
31. United States Brief for Appellant at 26-27, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
32. Id.
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further contended that those imagined changes in state statutory requirements
existed from that point and represented the then extant precleared condition of
Mississippi law.'
In the latter part of 1994, the Assistant Secretary of State, believing state
statutes would be changed, took it upon herself to verbally advise circuit clerks in
attendance at a seminar to begin enrolling NVRA registrants on state voter rolls
on January 1, 1995, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature would not even
have convened by that date. No one with the Mississippi Attorney General's
Office was aware that this advice had been given. No one with the Mississippi
Attorney General's Office was even aware that the Assistant Secretary of State's
submission to the Department of Justice had been made. The plaintiffs contended that on January 1, 1995, Mississippi election officials (circuit clerks) began
implementing the NVRA under a unitary system."4 In fact, for the short time
from January 1, 1995, until correct advice was sent them on February 10, 1995,
only thirty-one of the eighty-two county circuit clerks followed the Assistant
Secretary of State's advice."5
After the proposed legislation died on January 25, 1995, concerned circuit
clerks began calling the State Attorney General's Office inquiring about the propriety of enrolling NVRA registrants on state voter rolls. On February 10, 1995,
an attorney with the office of the Secretary of State and an attorney with the
Mississippi Attorney General's Office dispelled the confusion caused by the
Assistant Secretary of State's verbal advice. They sent a memorandum to circuit clerks and chairmen of county election commissions across the state advising that the proposed legislation had died in committee and advising that
Mississippi law for state and local elections remained unchanged. 7 The memorandum advised the officials that because state requirements were unchanged,
they should continue to follow state law as written, without regard to the prior
contrary advice from the Assistant Secretary of State. 8
The plaintiffs misconstrued the nature of the state's existing universal registration system.' They argued that prior to the implementation of the NVRA all reg33. Young, 117 S. Ct. at 1235.
34. Brief for Appellant at 4, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
35. Brief for Appellee at 8, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
36. The memorandum is included in the Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 20a,
Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. At one time Mississippi did have a true dual registration system, Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-11-1 (1972),
whereunder residents of municipalities were requiredto register twice in order to be eligible to vote in local and
state elections. The first registration had to be with the county registrar. In order to vote in municipal elections,
voters then had to register with the municipal registrar. This condition was described in Mississippi State
Chapter Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987). After the district court decision in
PUSH, the state responded legislatively by adopting a unified registration system, MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1
to -151 (1990), whereunder a qualified individual may register one time, pursuant to state requirements, and be
eligible for every local, state, or federal election. There is no requirement that anyone register more than one
time in order to be fully registered to vote. The legislature then further liberalized the state's voter registration
system by passing a mail-in voter registration system. MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-47 (Supp. 1997).
Accordingly, the state has gone beyond the measures needed to address the concerns set out by the district court
in the initial PUSH decision, and it has thoroughly revamped its voter registration requirements to expand voter
registration opportunities. See generally Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 788 E Supp
1406, 1408-12 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (summarizing PUSH litigation and expansion of voter registration opportunities).
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istrants were universally registered, but that after NVRA implementation this was
no longer so.40 In reality, both before and after NVRA implementation, all persons registeringpursuant to state statutory requirementswere and are universally
registered. 1 The implementation of the NVRA caused no change in this system.
The state administers the same system of voter registration today that it administered prior to implementation of the NVRA on January 1, 1995. The NVRA
merely added an additional method for registration for federal elections. There is
no dual registration system in Mississippi. There is no requirement that anyone
register twice in order to be universally registered. With implementation of the
NVRA,a separate system of registration for federal elections exists, but it was
the United States, not Mississippi, which created the additional method of registration. The defendants' position was that Mississippi made no changes requiring preclearance, with the possible exception of the administrative changes
described above, which had already been precleared.42
After the complaint was filed, a three-judge district court was promptly convened and cross-motions for partial summary judgment were filed on the section
5 issue. 3 The court granted the defendants' motion, and the section 5 claim was
dismissed." The district court ruled that the administrative actions taken by
Mississippi in implementing the NVRA had received preclearance from the
Attorney General." The court also ruled that no other changes affecting voting
had occurred." The district court ruled that the unauthorized actions of the
Assistant Secretary of State, and the thirty-one circuit clerks who followed her
advice to enroll NVRA registrants on state voter rolls, amounted to nothing more
than a "misapplication" of state law. 7 The district court recognized that the
errant advice of an Assistant Secretary of State and the temporary actions of
some circuit clerks did not in fact represent state choice and did not amount to a
state-initiated change affecting voting. 8
Contrary to arguments made by the plaintiffs, the district court did not rule,
and the defendants did not contend, that the state could initiate changes without
submitting them for section 5 scrutiny merely because such changes might be
part of an NVRA implementation plan. 9 The district court did rule, and the
defendants did contend, that conditions initiated and required by federal law are
not within the scope of section 5 coverage. The district court ruled that the separate federal-only registration system was a condition initiated and required by
40. Brief for Appellant at 4, Young v. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
41. MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1 (1990).
42. Young v. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 1228, 1237 (1997).
43. Id. at 1234.
44. Id. A separate claim for relief alleging insufficient compliance with the requirements of the NVRA was
voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs. Young v. Fordice, No. 3:95CVI97(L)(N) (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995),
reproduced in Juris.Statement at la, Young v. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 1235.
47. Id. at 1234.
48. Young v. Fordice, No. 3:95CV197(L)(N) (S. D. Miss. July 24, 1995), reproduced in Juris. Statement at
la, Young v. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
49. Id.
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federal rather than state law. The court also held that the resulting separate system of federal-only registration did not need to be submitted for preclearance."0
II. THE POSITIONS

The plaintiffs had two general theories of liability. The first was designed to
force a judicial change in state voter registration requirements. The plaintiffs
contended that because the Assistant Secretary of State had purported to submit
changes in state registration law for preclearance, and because the Attorney
General had precleared those purported changes, the changes were effective on
the date the Attorney General granted preclearance-February 1, 1995.51 The
plaintiffs argued that a benchmark was thereby established and that the memorandum dated February 10, 1995, advising election officials that the proposed
legislation had been rejected and that they should continue to enforce the old
requirements amounted to a second, regressive, and unprecleared change. 2 Had
this position been accepted by the court, Mississippi law would have effectively
been changed by the actions of the Assistant Secretary of State and employees of
the Department of Justice.
The plaintiffs' second theory of liability was designed to require the defendants
to resubmit the state's administrative plans for implementing the NVRA. The
plaintiffs argued that the Department of Justice's preclearance of the state's
administrative actions was invalid. 3 The plaintiffs contended that preclearance
was granted on the understanding that those choices were submitted in the context of a unified system, but that the implementation was made in the context of
separate systems.5" The plaintiffs argued the preclearance granted by the
Department of Justice was not based on an informed assessment and the choices
and policies of the state should be resubmitted for section 5 review so the
Department could assess those same choices and policies in the context of a separate registration system."5 The United States, as amicus, argued additionally
that the state's choice to implement the NVRA as a separate registration system,
rather than change its own registration laws, had to be precleared.5 8 In other
words, the United States argued that the state's decision to make no change was,
itself, within the requirement that voting changes be submitted for preclearance.
The defendants' position was that there were no legislative changes requiring
preclearance and that the administrative policies implemented at the agency level
57
were almost entirely non-discretionary matters imposed by the NVRA.
Because these administrative actions did not represent changes initiated by the
58
state, the defendants contended that no preclearance was necessary.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Young v. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 1228, 1234 (1997).
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1237-39.
Id.. at 1237.
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Alternatively, the defendants argued that if it was determined that the administrative policies in fact required preclearance, such preclearance had been obtained
and was granted with full knowledge that the proposed legislative changes might
never be adopted. 9 Regarding the United States' argument that implementation
as a separate system itself required preclearance, the defendants contended that
the state had an absolute right to implement the NVRA as a federal-only registration system as provided by Congress."
The defendants identified two broad precepts that should be considered in the
analysis of the plaintiffs' theory of section 5 liability. First, states are free to
maintain requirements for voter registration for state elections separate from and
different from those requirements imposed by the federal government for federal
elections. 1 Second, only state-initiated changes in voting standards, practices, or
procedures are required to be submitted for preclearance under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. 2
The NVRA is federal legislation and as such should not require preclearance to
be effective. There were no state-initiated choices or changes in standards, practices, or procedures which needed preclearance consideration. The items contained in the submission, including the proposed legislation, were superfluous for
section 5 purposes. One of the issues of the case was whether the state's choices
for administratively implementing the NVRA amounted to discretionary changes
requiring section 5 preclearance, and, if so, whether the preclearance of those
matters by the Department of Justice was effective.63
The major pretense of the plaintiffs' position was that changes to the state's
statutory registration requirements had been accomplished either by virtue of the
submission and the preclearance, or by "practice and procedure" when some of
the state's circuit clerks temporarily enrolled NVRA registrants on state voter
rolls. 4 The Attorney General's preclearance letter provided the basis for the first
part of the plaintiffs' position. As noted above, the Attorney General expressed
no objection to two "changes" which could only have been accomplished
through legislative action. The first item was the elimination of the attesting
witness requirement to the state mail-in registration form.6 The second item
dealt with purging requirements. 7 Neither of these items could be changed
administratively. Each would have required legislative action.' In purporting to
preclear these items as part of the proposed legislation, the Attorney General
violated a Department of Justice regulation which expressly provides that "[t]he
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1238-39.
61. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding that states are free to maintain different voting age
requirement than that required for federal elections by the federal government).
62. See generally Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
63. Young, 117 S.Ct. at 1236-37.
64. Id. at 1235.
65. Id. at 1237.
66. Id. at 1232.
67. Id. at 1233.
68. Id. at 1237.
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Attorney General will not consider on the merits: (a) Any proposal for a change
affecting voting submitted prior to final enactment or administrative decis io n . . . . , 61

The "practice and procedure" portion of the plaintiffs' position stemmed from
the erroneous verbal advice given by the Assistant Secretary of State regarding
the placing of NVRA registrants on state voter rolls. The plaintiffs argued that
since some circuit clerks followed that advice for a period of several weeks, a
section 5 benchmark was established, notwithstanding the fact that the mistake
was temporary, was contrary to state law, and was rectified by the Mississippi
Attorney General as soon as it came to his attention.0 This contention was built
on several false premises.
The plaintiffs began with the mistaken notion that the Governor's Executive
Order 739 bestowed the Secretary of State with greater authority than it actually
did. The plaintiffs referred to the Secretary of State, variously, as the chief election officer for purposes of implementing the NVRA, or the chief election officer
for purposes of compliance with the NVRA.71 The extent of the Secretary of
State's responsibility and authority was clearly defined in the Executive Order as
"the chief state election official, who shall be responsible for coordination of
state responsibilitiesunder the Act" (emphasis added).72
Clearly, the Executive Order did not designate the Secretary of State as an election czar with the power to supplant the legislature with regard to matters relating
to elections, nor did it give the Secretary of State the power to dictate changes in
state registration or purging requirements. The plaintiffs did not attempt to
explain how such a transfer of power could have been accomplished under state
law. They also did not seem concerned that such new authority relating to elections would, itself, have required preclearance before such new authority could
have been exercised. The plaintiffs understandably tried to elevate the role of the
Secretary of State to bolster the false notion that actions of his assistant represented the actions of the State of Mississippi as a body politic and that the
Assistant Secretary of State had authority to submit matters which would change
state law.73
The plaintiffs and the United States attempted to bolster the argument that the
mistakes of the Assistant Secretary of State and the thirty-one circuit clerks were
state practices by asserting that the Assistant Secretary of State's advice to the
circuit clerks was an instruction or a directive to subordinate officials.74 The
actual communication to the circuit clerks was verbal. No official opinion was
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1235.
71. Brief forAppellantat 7, 39,Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
72. This definition and limitation of responsibility and authority is prescribed and required by 42 U.S.C. §
1973gg-8 (1994).
73. As set forth previously, the notion that the Assistant Secretary of State had authority to submit proposed
changes to state law is refuted by the proposed legislation itself. Section 22 of the proposed legislation expressly directs that the Mississippi Attorney General would have made the necessary submission if the legislation
had been adopted. The Senate bill which contained the proposed language is included in the Joint Appendix at
103, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
74. Brief for Appellant at 39,Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
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delivered by the Office of the Secretary of State, and no formal regulation was
adopted and filed. No transcription or other reproduction of the actual communication was ever made. Whatever the text of the communication, the Assistant
Secretary of State simply did not have the authority to dictate anything to the circuit clerks. She could offer her opinion, but no more. Her mistaken verbal
advice did not rise to the level of "an administrative agency issu[ing] a policy
directive" as contemplated by Justice Thomas' dissent in Morse v. Republican
m
Party of Virginia."
In any event, circuit clerks are not "subordinate officials" to the Secretary of
State or the Assistant Secretary of State. Pursuant to article 6, section 168 of the
Mississippi Constitution and section 9-7-121 and consecutive sections of
Mississippi Code Annotated, circuit clerks are independent constitutional county
officials who answer only to county voters.76 The fact that only thirty-one of the
State's eighty-two circuit clerks followed the advice demonstrates clearly that the
circuit clerks were not subordinate officials given their marching orders verbally
by an Assistant Secretary of State.
The plaintiffs contended that a benchmark was established, notwithstanding the
temporary, illegal, and sporadic nature of the "practice" of placing NVRA registrants on state voter rolls." The plaintiffs relied primarily on Perkins v.
Matthews78 in support of this position. In Perkins, the City of Canton chose, by
normal city council practice, to elect its aldermen by wards.79 State law at the
time required at-large elections and did not allow the ward selection method
adopted by the city.0 The city operated under its ward system for a number of
years. 1 Later the city attempted to return to at-large elections, citing state law as
the reason. 2 In a resulting section 5 challenge it was determined that use of the
ward system established a benchmark regardless of the requirements of state law
and that a return to an at-large system would be retrogressive.
Perkins does not control here. In Perkins, the City of Canton acted qua City of
Canton. The body politic made its choice and implemented it as the choice of
the city without first submitting the proposed changes to the Attorney General of
the United States or to the District Court for the District of Columbia. There
was no question of whether the original change to a ward system resulted from
the actions of an errant or rogue official. The action may have been insupportable under Mississippi law, but it was clearly the conscious choice of the city
75. 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
76. In the district court, the plaintiffs and the United States also argued that different circuit clerks made different decisions about whether and how to contact NVRA registrants to advise them of their federal-only status.
They argued that these decisions represented changes that had not been precleared. Regardless of the merit of
this contention, the circuit clerks were local officials not under the control of the defendants. To the extent, if
any, that those activities needed preclearance, any submissions should have been made by the local officials
involved. The section 5 status of those local matters does not affect Young.
77. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1235 (1997).
78. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
79. Id. at 394.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. id. at 382.
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itself. The Supreme Court correctly found that the political entity had consciously established a practice that served as a benchmark to determine the applicability of section 5 to the voting changes at issue.8"
In Young, the body politic was the State of Mississippi. The state never adopted or implemented a practice of placing NVRA registrants on state voter rolls.
The political entity, the state, consciously rejected the proposition through its
legislative process when the legislature rejected the proposed legislation. Neither
the mistaken advice of the Assistant Secretary of State nor the temporary following of that advice by thirty-one of the state's eighty-two circuit clerks represented
a policy choice of the state.88
The defendants argued that a much more analogous case is United States v.
Saint Landry ParishSchool Board.'

There, three poll commissioners engaged in

a pattern of buying votes. 8 The poll commissioners would enter the polling
booths with voters and cast the voters' ballots in the manner of the poll commissioners' choosing. 89 The voters would then receive payment. 0 The United States
filed suit claiming this practice was "an unapproved change in the state's procedure for assisting voters." 91 The court found the practice did not constitute the
action of a political entity, but, rather, was merely the action of errant officials."
The Court stated clearly
[a]lthough the actions of these poll commissioners could possibly be viewed as
a change in voting procedures within the meaning of § 5, we conclude that these
actions do not constitute a change that the state has enacted or sought to administer within the meaning of that section.... We do not dispute that the actions
of the three poll commissioners constitute actions of the state for certain purposes. (reference omitted) But one would not normally conclude that a state
"enacts or administers" a new voting procedure every time a state official deviates from the state's required procedures. The common sense meaning of "shall
enact" indicates that action of a state, as a body, is envisioned, and we think
"shall seek to... administer" was added to cover situations when an enactment
was not actually passed, but when a procedure was nonetheless widely administered with at least the implicit approval of the state governingauthority. (emphasis added).93

In Young, neither the state nor any state governing body enacted, administered,
or implicitly approved the errant advice given by the Assistant Secretary of State.
The factual scenario in Saint Landry Parish is clearly closer to the facts of
85. Id. at 394-95.
86. The plaintiffs in Young also cited City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983), in support of
their theory that a benchmark was established between January 1, and February 10, and that the February 10
memorandum changed state law and amounted to retrogression. Lockhart presents a circumstance which, in
principle, is indistinguishable from Perkins, 400 U.S. 379.
87. 601 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. Id. at 863.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 861.
92. Id. at 864.
93. Id.
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Young. While the Office of the Secretary of State has a role to play in administering the state's election machinery, the particular statutory provisions at issue
were not ambiguous and left no room for discretionary interpretation by the
Secretary of State. The verbal advice given by the Assistant Secretary of State
was simply wrong and did not represent any state policy.
The actions of the Assistant Secretary of State were those of a mid-level functionary who incorrectly anticipated that the Mississippi Legislature would adopt
legislative changes in the state's voting requirements. Here, the body politic has
not made a change with regard to state registration procedures. No benchmark
was established by the erroneous and temporary enrolling of NVRA registrants
on state voter rolls in thirty-one of the eighty-two counties. The February 10,
4
1995 memorandum did not change state procedure regarding state registration.
It was not a "change" within the meaning of section 5 and did not constitute retrogression. As stated in Saint Landry Parish, "[s]urely Congress did not intend
the Attorney General and the [D]istrict [C]ourt for the District of Columbia to
waste their time considering voting procedures that a state does not wish to enact
or administer." 11
The defendants recognized that it was probably futile to attempt to formulate a
test that would apply in all scenarios for determining whether activities of a state
employee represent actions of a state for purposes of section 5 coverage.9" The
Supreme Court had not before heard a case that squarely presented the issue.
The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Saint Landry Parish is clearly correct and
should control in Young. This is especially so where, as here, the actions were
clearly contrary to established law, were not widely followed, and were promptly
corrected when brought to the attention of more responsible state officials.
Actions of errant or rogue officials, even in conjunction with actions of officials
in the Justice Department, cannot operate to change state law or set section 5
benchmarks. Any other determination would be an open invitation to collusion
and would be contrary to the accepted procedures of seeking and obtaining section 5 preclearance.
There are other policy reasons for refusing to assign benchmark status to acts
of errant or rogue officials. Garden variety election challenges, prosecuted by
disappointed office seekers, routinely contain section 5 counts alleging that some
irregularity in the election represented a "change" for which preclearance had
not been obtained. The courts which consider these challenges generally discount the section 5 component of such challenges on the basis that such irregularities represent errors rather than chosen policy.97
94. Juris. Statement at 20a, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
95. Saint LandryParish,601 E2d at 864.
96. Brief for Appellee at 24, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
97. See generally Citizens' Right To Vote v. Morgan, 916 F Supp. 601 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (holding election
activities by officials in their individual capacities are not covered activities); Montgomery v. Leflore County
Republican Executive Comm., 776 F. Supp. 1142, 1145 (N.D. Miss. 1991) (holding illegal acts of officials do
not implicate section 5); Miller v. Daniels, 509 E Supp. 400, 406-07 (S.D.N.Y 1981) (holding actions of officials contrary to precleared law are not changes the jurisdiction "seeks to administer"); Beatty v. Esposito, 439
F Supp. 830, 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding episodic removal of election inspector by county official is not an
"enactment" covered by section 5).
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Errors can never be anticipated and submitted for preclearance, but if benchmark status had been accorded the Assistant Secretary of State's actions, covered
jurisdictions would be forced to make after-the-fact submissions of such errors
and irregularities in an effort to defend against ordinary election challenges.
Routine elections would be plagued with disruptions, uncertainty, and unnecessary costs. There is no justification for extending section 5 beyond its intended
scope. As explained in Saint Landry Parish, section 5 does not apply to "every
artifact of political manipulation. Section 5 has its own political cosmos, but it
does not possess a universality with respect to every electoral aberration."98
The position taken by the United States as amicus had an additional argument
not pressed by the plaintiffs. The United States began its amicus brief with a dramatically incorrect and unsupported proposition. The United States admitted
that the NVRA applies to federal elections only, and the Act does not require the
states to reconcile their state requirements with the NVRA. Accordingly, a state
could fulfill its NVRA responsibilities simply by having its agencies make proper registration forms available under proper circumstances and by including
NVRA registrants on voter rolls as eligible to vote in federal elections. These
actions, along with purging requirements peculiar to those registrants, are all that
the NVRA requires.99 The United States contended, however, that simply doing
what federal law requires amounted to a "choice" that required preclearance.
The United States asserted that by doing the things required by the NVRA, the
state had "chosen" not to do more. Specifically, the state had "chosen" not to
reconcile state requirements with the NVRA. The United States contended this
"choice" was one which required approval by federal authority before it could be
effective.
In contrast, the defendants argued that it is changes, not choices, that are within the scope of section 5 and require preclearance.' °° Choices may amount to a
decision to make a change, but choices may also amount to a decision to make
no change. If implemented, the plaintiffs' theory of section 5 coverage would
enable the Department of Justice to require any existing voting practice to be
submitted for preclearance on the proposition that the "choice" to maintain the
practice amounts to a section 5 violation. The Constitutional guarantee, as
explained in Oregon v. Mitchell,' that states have the power to establish voting
requirements different from those set by the federal government would cease to
exist for states covered by section 5. The legality of existing laws or practices
relating to voting can be tested by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act"0 2 or by
other challenges based on other state or federal authority. It is not the purpose of
section 5 to serve as a mechanism to challenge existing practices which have not
been changed. Young did not present a challenge based on section 2 or any
authority other than section 5. The plaintiffs set forth no principled reason, or
authority, to expand section 5 coverage in the manner sought.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Saint Landry Parish,601 E2d at 865.
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6 (1994).
Brief for Appellee at 26, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
400 U.S. 112 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
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Assuming the United States would consider Mississippi's "choice" not to
amend state voter requirements tantamount to a state-implemented retrogressive
dual registration system," 3 it is a virtual certainty that a covered jurisdiction such
as Mississippi could never "choose" to do less than conform its state laws to the
NVRA. The effect of this would be, of course, to cede complete authority over
state registration laws to the federal government. Covered jurisdictions could not
"opt out" and decouple state registration requirements from NVRA requirements
without getting preclearance. Succeeding Congresses could amend and enlarge
covered jurisdictions' NVRA requirements without regard to local concerns or
needs. The United States offered no hint of authority contained in the NVRA,
the Voting Rights Act, or elsewhere to support this extreme position.
This approach of bootstrapping section 5 and the NVRA in order to advance a
policy of forcing changes to state registration was implicitly rejected in Miller v.
Johnson."" In Miller, the Supreme Court held squarely that the purpose of section 5 is only to prevent retrogression in black voting strength. 1' 0 The court held
the United States' policy of using section 5 to advance a black-maximization
agenda with regard to redistricting was contrary to the true purpose of section 5
0
which is only to prevent retrogression."
The ruling in Miller cast considerable
additional doubt on the legitimacy of the United States' effort in Young.
Implementation of the NVRA as a separate method of registration, to exist side
by side with existing state methods of registration, is contemplated by the
NVRA. °7 Section 5, as construed in Miller, cannot be used to expand or maximize the dictates of the NVRA so as to force states covered by section 5 to
amend their registration statutes to conform to the requirements of the NVRA.
In Young, both the United States and the plaintiffs asserted that the Attorney
General was somehow misled regarding what was or was not being submitted for
preclearance. This assertion bordered on bad faith and was totally unsupported
in the record. The United States simply could not make a good faith assertion
that it did not understand that changes in state laws regarding state registration
were dependent on passage of the proposed legislative package. The material
submitted by the Assistant Secretary of State included a July, 1994, Status Report
which expressly pointed out that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to
establish a unitary system and to avoid a dual registration system.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' contention that the Department of Justice was
never expressly put on notice that proposed changes in state registration procedures were dependent on passage of the proposed legislation was demonstrably
103. Implementation of the NVRA as a federal-only system should not be found to amount to retrogression.
The effect of the implementation will be to cause a net increase in the total number of people registered to vote.
The number registered to vote in federal elections will increase. The number of people registered to vote in
state elections will not be decreased. This is not a condition of retrogression under any definition. Cf Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (ameliorative change, even if less than optimum, cannot constitute retrogression);
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (holding the same).
104. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
105. Id. at 925.
106. Id.
107. See Association of Community Org. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 880 F Supp. 1215, 1220 (N.D.
I11.1995) (holding states free to implement NVRA on federal-only basis).
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incorrect. If the Department truly needed a picture drawn, it was drawn by the
language of the Status Report and the inclusion of the proposed legislation itself.
The Department made a knowing choice to preclear administrative changes after
it knew the proposed legislation had been defeated. That choice was made in
order to construct the argument advanced in Young that a benchmark was established by virtue of the action of the Department.
The plaintiffs also contended that the failure of the proposed legislation rendered the submission inadequate since the submission did not indicate what
would happen should the legislation be defeated. 1 8 The plaintiffs argued that the
submission was ambiguous on the question and that such ambiguity should be
resolved against the state." 9 The plaintiffs cited Clark v. Roemer1 ' for this general proposition."' In reality, there is nothing ambiguous about what happens
when proposed legislation designed to make statutory changes fails. The
changes simply, and unambiguously, do not occur. Here, the Department of
Justice made a conscious decision to participate in the creation of a pretended
ambiguity and then attempted to use this pretended ambiguity as a tool to help
implement its policy choice. Nothing in Clark supports the notion that such
"ambiguity" should be resolved against the state. The reality is the Department
liked what it saw in the amalgamated mass of materials proffered to it as a submission. The Department seized what it considered to be an opportunity to force
a change in the state's registration laws and issued the preclearance letter. The
Department's decision to preclear was clearly calculated. It should not have been
allowed to disavow that decision.
The plaintiffs also argued the district court erroneously ruled that the
Department of Justice "implicitly precleared" a federal-only NVRA implementation plan. The plaintiffs cited McCain v. Lybrand"2 and Clark"3 for the proposition that preclearance by implication is disallowed. 4 In the first place, McCain
and Clark deal with changes made but not identified, not changes imagined but
not made. In any event, the district court did not rule that anything was precleared on the basis of an implication.115 It merely noted the Department of
Justice would have had to violate its own regulation'16 to preclear legislative
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
Young
116.

Id.
Id.
500 U.S. 646 (1991).
Brief for Appellant at 28,Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
465 U.S. 236, 249 (1984).
500 U.S. 646 (1991).
Brief for Appellant at 32-33, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
Young v. Fordice, No 3:95CV197(L)(N) (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995), reproduced in Juris. Statement at la,
v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-203 1).
28 C.F.R. § 51.22 (1997).
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changes that had not yet occurred."' The district court concluded the department
did not violate this regulation and did not intend to preclear legislative
changes." 8 It also concluded that all the Department meant to preclear were the
administrative policies that had been submitted to it as changes. 1 9' By contrast, it
was the United States which later argued the preclearance was granted on the
basis of an implication. 2 It argued that it perceived that state statutes were
somehow going to be changed solely by reason of the submission and the act of
preclearance. 2 If anything in Young was contrary to McCain and Clark, it was
the United States' theory, not the district court's ruling.
Further, the plaintiffs and amici misconstrued the district court's ruling regarding the necessity of seeking section 5 preclearance for changes caused by federal
law. The plaintiffs and amici contended that the district court ruled that changes
in state law are excused the necessity of preclearance, as long as those changes
are part of a plan to implement a federal directive. 22 This is simply not what
the court held. The district court held, correctly, that no changes in state registration requirements occurred.'23 Because of this ruling, the district court never
addressed the issue stated by the plaintiffs.
In fact, the district court ruled that a separate system for registering federal
voters was not, itself, a condition that needed preclearance. 24 This condition was
brought about by federal law. The State of Mississippi is the covered jurisdiction, not the United States. Changes made by the United States are not subject to
preclearance. If the state had adopted changes in its state voting requirements,
those changes would have been subject to preclearance, even though any such
changes would have been designed as part of an overall package to implement
federal legislation. The district court did not hold otherwise, and the defendants
did not contend otherwise.
In conclusion, the defendants argued the total of all that transpired was that
there were no changes in state law, and the NVRA was implemented precisely as
117. In her eagerness to attempt to establish a benchmark by issuing the preclearance letter, the Attorney
General disregarded almost every regulation governing the content of section 5 submissions. The Attorney
General simply read into the material sent to her inferences that suited her. A regulation titled "Required
Contents," 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (1996), lists certain requirements for the contents of proper submissions. None of
these requirements was enforced. Some of the requirements, such as subparts (c) and (h), require specific
statements regarding changes between the prior law and the newly enacted law and statements regarding the
jurisdictional basis and procedures for the change. A regulation titled "Obtaining information from the submitting authority," 28 C.F.R. § 51.37 (1996), provides that the Attorney General may request additional information
regarding the actual effect of any submitted change. If there was truly any doubt, the Attorney General should
simply have asked the Assistant Secretary of State what the effect of the defeat of the legislative package was.
If the Justice Department had required a proper submission restricted only to completed changes as required by
28 C.ER. § 51.22, it could not have pretended that ambiguities existed.
118. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1234 (1997).
119. Id.
120. United States Brief for Appellant at 6, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
121. Id. at 26.
122. Brief for Appellant at 41, United States Brief for Appellant at 23, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228
(1997) (No. 95-2031).
123. Young, 117 S. Ct. at 1234.
124. Young v. Fordice, No. 3:95CV197(L)(N) (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995), reproduced in Juris. Statement at
la, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).

1998]

VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN MISSISSIPPI

contemplated by Congress. 125 The simple fact that the poor judgment of a midlevel state employee caused some confusion in the process was meaningless.
The principles of federalism are tested severely enough by the requirement that
changes which a state genuinely wants to implement must be submitted to federal authority for approval. The notion that the device of preclearance could be utilized to impose unwanted changes on a state should have been emphatically
rejected by the Supreme Court.
III. ORAL

ARGUMENT

Oral argument was January 6, 1997. From the moment arguing counsel
entered the Supreme Court building they encountered a process which has been
successftlly designed to instill a sense of awe. After passing through security,
the lawyer's membership in the Supreme Court Bar is confirmed. From there he
is escorted to the Lawyer's Lounge where he is greeted by the Clerk of the Court,
who is attired in a morning coat. The Clerk explains the protocol to be followed,
including the seating arrangement. Identification cards are distributed, and after
another security check, counsel enter the courtroom.
I was never truly nervous until oral argument began on the case before Young.
In that case, the Justices focused on minute fact details and asked intricate questions relating to Supreme Court precedent. In Young, the parties and the district
court had focused on the larger issues and had virtually ignored the minutiae
contained in the submissions made by the Assistant Secretary of State. All concerned had considered those details unimportant. Also, for Young there was very
little in the way of precedent, at least of which I was aware. While listening to
the questioning in the case before Young, I went from a state of relative calm to a
state of near panic. If the Justices intended to reach the same level of detail in
Young, I was in imminent danger of humiliation. During the lunch break before
arguments began, I was unable to eat, and I was just about ready to settle the case
and go home.
As appellants, the other side had to argue first. Once the actual argument
began, it quickly became obvious the Justices were focused on the same big picture questions that the parties and the district court had focused on before. I
quickly relaxed and began to enjoy breathing once again. It became apparent the
Justices had a thorough understanding of the important facts of the case, and of
course, the applicable law. It also was apparent that the Justices had relatively
fixed positions on the issues, and their questions were calculated to elicit answers
which the Justices hoped might help their respective positions in the decisional
conference to be held later. Many of the questions were clearly tailored to gain
concessions from counsel on particular points. I found myself arguing with,
rather than to, several of the Justices. It was clear, though, this was expected
from counsel. Despite the fact that the Justices had very different points of view,
they were invariably gracious during questioning.
125. Brief forAppellee at 33, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
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It also became clear early in the argument that answers to questions had to be
concise. Counsel rarely got more than two or three sentences into an answer
before the next question was posed. Every Justice, except Justice Thomas, asked
questions during the argument. I do not believe any of the three arguing counsel
ever once referred to prepared notes. The pace of the questioning did not permit
it. I began my argument by addressing a question Justice O'Connor had asked
counsel opposite. From that moment on, the entirety of my argument consisted
of answering a rapid sequence of questions from the bench.
The Justices' questions gave a fairly accurate preview of the decision. The
Justices immediately seemed to discount the notion that the state could be said to
have changed its state registration laws. Justice Scalia referred to the fact that
various circuit clerks had temporarily placed NVRA registrants on state voter
rolls as simply a "false start" in the NVRA implementation process. None of the
Justices seemed to defend the plaintiffs' contention that the state had effectively
changed its requirements for state registration. Several of the Justices seemed
skeptical of the defendants' argument that the preclearance of the state's administrative choices was legally sufficient. Those Justices seemed strongly inclined to
give the Department of Justice the benefit of any doubt on that point.
The most crucial issue of the proceeding was whether the state could maintain
its original registration requirements and implement the requirements of the
NVRA as a separate system. This point seemed to provoke the greatest disagreement among the Justices. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens seemed
eager to adopt the plaintiffs' position and hold that separate systems were unacceptable. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor seemed more
inclined to accept the defendants' position that separate systems were contemplated under the NVRA and that the Voting Rights Act would not prevent the
state from narrowly following the mandates of the NVRA.
Apart from the legal calculations that were constantly being made during the
oral argument, I realized something quite unexpected was happening-I was
having a great deal of fun. During all of the research, briefing, and preparation
for the argument, the concept of having fun had never occurred to me. As it happened, however, the argument was easily the most fun I have ever had in any
courtroom. Immediately after the argument, the sense of enjoyment was augmented by a strong sense of fulfillment. The quill pen given by the Court to
counsel as a memento is now in a shadow box beside my desk. Whenever I see
the quill, I get a pleasant feeling of satisfaction that I suspect will never diminish.
IV THE

DECISION

The decision was handed down on March 31, 1997, and came as something of
a blow. The decision essentially was divided into three parts. First, the Court
held the preclearance given by the Department of Justice regarding the agency
implementation of the NVRA was ineffective.12 The Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that, because the original submission incorrectly contemplated a
126. Young, 117 S. Ct. at 1235.
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unified system of registration, the preclearance was not knowingly made.127
Though disappointing, this result was not totally unexpected from the questioning during oral argument. The defendants did not, after all, consider this issue
particularly important. At worst, the defendants felt that if the Court should
reverse on this issue, the defendants would modify the NVRA registration form
to include a statement informing the registrant that the registration was only for
federal elections. The defendants would then resubmit the same agency choices
and other material for preclearance as part of a system of separate registrations.
The defendants reasoned that if certain agencies and processes were not objectionable in the context of a unified system, those same agencies and processes
should not be objectionable in the context of separate systems.
The second portion of the decision rejected the plaintiffs' contention that state
registration requirements had been changed by virtue of the submission and pre'
Again, given the questioning at oral argument, this was expected.
clearance. 28
The third portion of the ruling amounts technically to a split decision, but it
portends the forced amendment of Mississippi registration law. The plaintiffs
had contended the state could not lawfully administer separate registration systems and had to amend its registration laws to enroll NVRA registrants on state
voter rolls.129 The defendants had contended the NVRA and the Voting Rights
Act could not be bootstrapped together so as to force the state to amend its existing registration system. 3 ' The parties and the amici took absolute positions. The
Court did not agree with either absolute. 31
The Court held the NVRA applies only to federal elections.'32 At the same
time, the Court held there is no absolute right to implement the NVRA as a separate system, even though such an implementation would comply with the
requirements of the NVRA 33 The Court held that in considering the resubmission of the NVRA implementation process, the Department of Justice may properly consider Mississippi's history together with the "purpose" and "practical
effect" of implementing the NVRA as a separate system.' 3
By this ruling, the Court gave the Department of Justice the authority to object
to the very selection of agencies and processes which the Department had previously found unobjectionable. A secondary effect of this ruling is to ratify the
position taken by the Department of Justice that every matter submitted for section 5 preclearance by the state, or any political subdivision, is subject to scrutiny
in the context of the existence of a separate registration system. Accordingly,
neither the state nor any political subdivision will be able to get section 5 preclearance for any voting change without first satisfying the Department of
Justice that the existence of separate systems does not have the purpose and will
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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not have the effect of abridging anyone's right to vote on account of race. The
Department has, of course, already demonstrated its firm contrary position. The
ruling in Young means, for all practical purposes, that Attorney General preclearance is not available to Mississippi and its political subdivisions unless and until
the registration systems are merged. The only alternative method for preclearing
changes relating to voting is for the state, and each subjurisdiction in the state, to
prosecute separate actions for declaratory judgment in the district court for the
District of Columbia each time any voting change is attempted. This is, of
course, an unworkable proposition.
The practical result of Young is that until either preclearance is obtained in the
District of Columbia, or the separate registration systems are merged or reconciled, no special elections requiring preclearance, such as school bond referenda
or office vacancy elections, will be conducted anywhere in the state. As a practical matter, the Court's ruling legitimizes the leverage the Department of Justice
has wielded against the state throughout this process. The prospect of winning
an action against the Attorney General in district court in the District of
Columbia is remote. The prospect of protecting any such victory on appeal to
the Supreme Court is even more remote. The state is faced with the choice of
placing NVRA registrants on state voter rolls or having its electoral processes
suffer a total section 5 paralysis.
The legacy of Young is that the predisposition of the federal government to
diminish Mississippi's control of voting within the state has come full circle.
With the Voting Rights Act, the federal government gained the right to veto proposed changes to the state's elections structure. With Young, the federal government has effectively ensured that Mississippi will be forced to change its state
voter registration statutes to incorporate NVRA registrants. If that is done,
Congress will be able to control access to the state's registration rolls by legislatively changing the requirements of the NVRA. Unlike states not covered by the
Voting Rights Act, Mississippi will never be able to decouple from the NVRA
without section 5 preclearance. The guarantee of electoral independence for
states set forth in Oregon v. Mitchell 35 can no longer be said to exist in
Mississippi or in the other states covered by the Voting Rights Act.
135. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

